## Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports Volume 183

## (Replaces Prior Cumulative Table)

| Bank of America, N.A. v. Kydes   | 479 |
|--|-----|
| pursuant to rule of practice (§ 13-23 [a]); claim that trial court improperly relied on defendant's admissions as basis for finding that original plaintiff had  |     |
| standing to bring this action and for rendering summary judgment; claim that   |     |
| trial court erred in failing to hold evidentiary hearing on challenge to original  |     |
| plaintiff's $standing$ .   |     |
| Clark v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles  | 426 |
| Administrative appeal; suspension of motor vehicle operator's and commercial driver's licenses by defendant Commissioner of Motor Vehicles; claim that trial court incorrectly determined that there was substantial evidence in record to support finding that there was probable cause that plaintiff operated his motor vehicle while under influence of liquor within two hours preceding his failed blood alcohol content tests; whether inferences underlying commissioner's conclusion that plaintiff was operating his vehicle after certain time were supported by compelling circumstantial evidence in record; whether trial court abused its discretion in denying motion to reargue or for reconsideration, claim that plaintiff received ineffective assistance from counsel at administrative hearing resulting in failure to present additional relevant evidence. |     |
| Conroy v. Idlibi   | 460 |
| Dissolution of marriage; claim that trial court erred by finding that neither party was at fault for breakdown of marriage; claim that trial court erred by making financial awards favorable to plaintiff; whether trial court's factual finding that neither party bore greater responsibility for breakdown of marriage was clearly erroneous; whether trial court properly considered appropriate statutory factors in making financial awards; whether financial awards were supported by evidence and within parameters of trial court's discretion.   | 400 |
| Corneroli v. Kutz  | 401 |
| Legal malpractice; whether trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of defendants on basis of its conclusion that there was insufficient expert testimony on issue of causation; whether Connecticut law generally requires plaintiff in legal malpractice action arising from prior litigation to prove, through expert testimony, that but for alleged breach of duty, it was more likely than not that he would have prevailed in underlying cause of action; reviewability of claim that trial court improperly considered defendants' reply brief, which, contrary to its certification, was not received by plaintiff's counsel prior to morning of hearing on defendants' motion for summary judgment; whether trial court properly permitted defendants to file surreply.   |     |
| DAB Three, LLC v. LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc   | 307 |
| Emeritus Senior Living v. Lepore   | 23  |
| Contracts; action to collect unpaid balance due for assisted living services; motion for summary judgment; whether trial court improperly found that residency agreement was unenforceable due to procedural or substantive flaws; whether record revealed that defendant had no meaningful choice whether to select plaintiff as provider of assisted living services; whether agreement was sufficiently clear as written to provide reasonable notice to defendant, as representative, to pay all sums due for services rendered; whether agreement plainly and unambiguously   | 20  |
|  |     |

| imposed personal liability on defendant in representative capacity for amounts owed to plaintiff, whether agreement was substantively unconscionable; whether agreement to ensure payment for services rendered was so unreasonable as to be unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable; whether trial court erred by finding residency agreement unenforceable as matter of public policy.  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Hallums.  | 175        |
|---|------------|
| Foreclosure, strict foreclosure; claim that trial court improperly rendered judgment when plaintiff bank lacked standing; claim that trial court lacked jurisdiction after defendant's debt was discharged in bankruptcy; claim that trial court improperly refused to apply best evidence rule and clean hands doctrine; whether trial court's findings were supported by record evidence; whether defendant submitted proof that someone else was owner of note and mortgage; whether in rem liability of mortgages survive discharge in bankruptcy; whether creditor's right to foreclose mortgage passes through bankruptcy proceedings; claim that debt and note became unsecured when defendant unilaterally described obligation as unsecured in bankruptcy filings despite valid mortgage lien. |            |
| Handel v. Commissioner of Social Services .  Administrative appeal; application for Medicaid benefits; whether defendant's decision was not rendered within ninety days of date that plaintiff requested fair hearing, as required by statute (§§ 17b-60 and 17b-61) and applicable federal regulation (42 C.F.R. § 431.244 [f] [2013]); whether administrative appeal from denial of Medicaid benefits should have been sustained.   | 392        |
| Hum v. Silvester Injunction; whether trial court correctly determined that defendants had prescriptive easement over shared driveway; whether evidence supported court's finding that use of driveway by defendants and their predecessor in title was open, visible, and continuous for more than fifteen years under claim of right; doctrine of tacking, discussed.  | 489        |
| In re James H. (See In re Katherine H.)  In re Katherine H.  Child neglect; whether trial court's findings were clearly erroneous; whether trial court abused its discretion in committing children to custody of Commissioner of Children and Families.  | 320<br>320 |
| In re Zoey H  | 327        |
| Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC   | 128        |

| Kargul v. Smith  | 78  |
|--|-----|
| Magsig v. Magsig.  Dissolution of marriage; postjudgment motion for contempt; claim that defendant wilfully and intentionally breached parties' separation agreement to hold plaintiff harmless for certain debt by intentionally defaulting on loan, which caused plaintiff to suffer losses; whether trial court properly concluded that agreement did not require plaintiff to be indemnified for any collateral damages that may be caused directly or indirectly by the nonpayment of debt; claim that trial court improperly considered evidence outside of four corners of agreement in determining parties' intent with respect to indemnification language; whether defendant's testimony regarding his understanding of what triggered obligation to indemnify plaintiff was properly admitted for purpose of determining whether defendant had wilfully violated agreement; claim that because indemnification language used in agreement indemnified against liability, plaintiff was not required to wait until she sustained actual loss to bring successful motion for contempt; whether trial court properly concluded that defendant's indemnity obligation was not triggered until bank took affirmative steps to collect from plaintiff with respect to debt. | 182 |
| Mikucka v. St. Lucian's Residence, Inc   | 147 |
| Speer v. Dept. of Agriculture  | 298 |
| St. Juste v. Commissioner of Correction  | 471 |
| Starble v. Inland Wetlands Commission  | 280 |

| State v. Baldwin .  Risk of injury to child; violation of probation; claim that trial court's denial of motion to modify conditions of probation violated defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in future proceedings; whether defendant waived claim by entering Alford plea and expressly agreeing, on record, to participate in sex offender treatment, including admitting to conduct that resulted in Alford plea; claim that trial court abused its discretion in denying motion to modify and not allowing defendant to delay participating in sex offender treatment until after conclusion of pending habeas matter.   | 167  |
|--|------|
| State v. Dubuisson   | 62   |
| Strangulation in second degree; whether evidence was sufficient for jury to have found beyond reasonable doubt that defendant committed strangulation in second degree; whether jury reasonably and logically could have concluded that defendant put his hand around victim's neck with intent to render her unable to breathe and, while acting under that intent, squeezed her neck with his fingers, thereby rendering her unable to breathe; whether trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence, under spontaneous utterance exception to hearsay rule, testimony regarding victim's statements to friend during telephone conversation; claim that because there was break in time between when defendant strangled victim and victim called friend, statements were not spontaneous.  |      |
| State v. Fletcher  | 1    |
| Violation of probation; claim that appeal was moot because there was no practical relief that could be afforded to defendant, who had completed sentence for violating probation; whether appeal qualified for exception to mootness doctrine; whether there was reasonable possibility that, in event that defendant were to face sentencing court in future, court's determination revoking his probation and sentencing him to period of incarceration could subject him to prejudicial collateral consequences; whether there was reasonable possibility that presence of defendant's sentence for violation of probation could subject him to prejudicial collateral consequences affecting his employment opportunities and his standing in community generally; whether there was practical relief that could be afforded to defendant; unpreserved claim that trial court improperly relied on fact that was not part of record when it found that defendant had tried to elude law enforcement in their efforts to serve violation of probation warrant; whether information on which court relied satisfied requisite standard of reliability; whether defendant demonstrated that inference drawn by court was unreasonable or unjustifiable.  State v Gerald A | 82   |
| State v. Gerald A  | 82   |
| Sexual assault in first degree; risk of injury to child; whether evidence was sufficient to support conviction of sexual assault in first degree; claim that state failed to prove that defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with victim within meaning of applicable statute (§ 53a-65 [2]); whether trial court abused its discretion when it admitted certain uncharged misconduct testimony pertaining to defendant's alleged prior physical violence toward victim and her family; whether probative value of uncharged misconduct evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect; whether trial court properly permitted two cases against defendant to be tried jointly; whether evidence in each case would have been cross admissible as prior misconduct in other case; claim that defendant's conduct in each case was not similar; claim that prejudicial effect of evidence outweighed its probative value; whether trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to make opening statement to jury; whether trial court's ruling was harmful.  |      |
| State v. Morice W  | 32   |
| State v. Morris  | 181  |
| Writ of error; unpreserved claim that trial court violated right to due process of plaintiff in error during adjudication of bond forfeiture proceedings; whether trial court properly denied motion for release from surety obligations of plaintiff in error.  | -01  |
| State v. Petitpas  | 442  |
| Sexual assault in first degree; sexual assault in second degree; sexual assault in fourth degree; unlawful restraint in second degree; risk of injury to child; motion to correct illegal sentence; claim that trial court abused discretion in denying  | - 10 |

| motion to correct illegal sentence; whether sentencing court materially relied on inaccurate information in imposing sentence.  |      |
|---|------|
| State v. Smith  Criminal possession of firearm; possession of weapon in motor vehicle; carrying pistol or revolver without permit; whether evidence was sufficient to support conviction of criminal possession of firearm, possession of weapon in motor vehicle, and carrying pistol or revolver without permit; whether jury reasonably could have found that defendant had handgun in his vehicle for which he did not have permit and was guilty as charged.   | 54   |
| State v. Taveras  | 354  |
| Violation of probation; revocation of probation; whether words defendant used to express frustration with preschool staff member constituted fighting words or true threat under first amendment to United States constitution or under statute proscribing breach of peace in second degree (§ 53a-181 [a] [1] and [3]); claim that there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant committed breach of peace in second degree on basis of nonverbal conduct; whether evidence was sufficient to support claim that trial court reasonably could have inferred that defendant's alleged threat to preschool staff member was component of defendant's nonverbal conduct; whether defendant's statement to preschool staff member, "you better be careful, you better watch yourself," constituted fighting words within meaning of § 53a-181 (a) (1) or (3); whether defendant's statement had tendency to provoke imminent retaliation from average person in staff member's position; whether defendant's statement constituted true threat within meaning of § 53a-181 (a) (3); whether state adduced sufficient evidence to show that reasonable listener would have been highly likely to interpret statement as serious expression of intent to harm or assault staff member.   |      |
| Tala E. H. v. Syed I  | 224  |
| Civil protection order; unpreserved claim that manner in which trial court conducted hearing on continuance of protective order constituted judicial misconduct and bias; whether defendant demonstrated that trial court exhibited bias against him and was guilty of judicial misconduct that affected integrity of proceeding and denied him fair trial; whether trial court misapprehend facts or abuse its discretion by continuing protective order for six months; whether defendant's actions constituted stalking under applicable statute (§ 46b-15 [a]); claim that trial court's consideration of evidence of defendant's placement of certain security cameras and tracking device was improper; whether trial court's erroneous finding that defendant went to home of plaintiff's aunt was harmless.   |      |
| Webster Bank, N.A. v. Frasca  | 249  |
| Foreclosure; motion for deficiency judgment; whether trial court committed plain error in failing to consider certain property valuations in plaintiff's appraisal report; whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for court to determine value of property on date title vested; whether plaintiff's appraisal report was unreliable; whether plaintiff demonstrated that claimed error was both so clear and harmful that failure to reverse judgment would result in manifest injustice; whether trial court committed plain error in imposing preponderance of evidence standard of proof under statute (§ 49-14) instead of probable cause standard of proof; whether trial court committed plain error in making certain comments on record during hearing; whether certain of trial court's comments demonstrated hostility toward plaintiff or were manifestation of bias; whether trial court's remarks throughout hearing referencing knowledge derived from extrajudicial sources were relied on by court in analytical decision-making process in denying motion for deficiency judgment; whether trial court abused its discretion in admitting and relying on certain evidence submitted during hearing; whether defendant presented ample evidence for court to determine that plaintiff failed to satisfy burden of demonstrating fair market value of property as of date title vested in plaintiff; whether court's decision to find no credible valuation on basis of plaintiff's failure to meet burden was within reasonable bounds of discretion; whether trial court abused discretion in denying motion for protective order in response to notice of deposition. | 2000 |
| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lorson  | 200  |
| Foreclosure; whether trial court's determination that plaintiff proved its prima facie case was clearly erroneous; claim that plaintiff had burden to prove compliance with United States Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations that pertained to home mortgage foreclosure actions as condition precedent to bringing foreclosure action: whether defendants had affirmative duty to plead   |      |

| noncompliance with regulations as special defense; whether trial court correctly determined that defendants failed to prove their special defense of equitable estoppel; claim that trial court's finding that defendants failed to prove special defense of unclean hands was clearly erroneous. |     |
|---|-----|
| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Vollenweider (Memorandum Decision)  | 901 |
| Zilkha v. Zilkha.   | 452 |
| Dissolution of marriage; guardian ad litem fees; claim that trial court abused its  |     |
| discretion by precluding defendant from presenting certain evidence regarding   |     |
| background of guardian ad litem when trial court determined that such evidence  |     |
| was irrelevant to determining amount and apportionment of guardian's fees   |     |
| pursuant to statute (§ 46b-62); whether trial court correctly exercised its discre-   |     |
| tion by implementing sliding scale model developed by Judicial Branch pursuant  |     |
| to § 46b-62 and adjusting award upward on basis of delineated factors.  |     |